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I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States of America has traditionally been a country of 
opportunity for many legal immigrants.  But the process of establishing a 
life in their new home country has never been easy on immigrants, who 
have historically faced legal discrimination, often in the form of laws 
aimed at preventing them from working.1  In Takashi v. Fish &Game 
Commission, the Supreme Court noted that “[t]he assertion of an 
authority to deny to aliens the opportunity of earning a livelihood when 
lawfully admitted to the state would be tantamount to the assertion of the 
right to deny them entrance and abode, for in ordinary cases they cannot 
live where they cannot work.”2  Yet today there is a group of legal 
immigrants in the United States that are facing precisely this dilemma.  
Nonimmigrants, a class of legal aliens who reside in the United States 
under temporary visas,3 have recently brought a series of challenges to 
laws that have discriminated against them on basis of their legal status.4  
Decades after the Supreme Court ruled in Takashi, the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals invoked this issue when it concluded that the State of 
New York could not prevent immigrants with temporary work visas from 
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1Takashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 416 (1948). 
 2 Id. at  416  (striking down a law preventing people of Japanese descent, who were 
at the time ineligible for citizenship because of their race, from receiving fishing 
licenses). 
 3 RICHARD D. STEEL, STEEL ON IMMIGRATION LAW § 2:23 (2013 ed.). 
 4 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
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becoming licensed pharmacists in the state.5  This ruling was the first in a 
series of steps necessary for the court system to prevent state 
discrimination against nonimmigrants.6  Further protections for 
nonimmigrants are needed, however.7  Courts should evaluate 
discriminatory state laws under the Equal Protection Clause using strict 
scrutiny review, both because nonimmigrants are a suspect class and 
because the Supreme Court has previously ruled that classifications 
based on alienage are reviewed using strict scrutiny.8 
In 1971, the Supreme Court in Graham v. Richardson considered 
whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
prohibited states from discriminating between residents on the basis of 
alien status.9  In doing so, the Supreme Court had to determine whether it 
would review the laws under rational basis review, a standard that is very 
deferential to the government, or strict scrutiny, the highest level of 
Equal Protection review.10  The Court held that “classifications based on 
alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently suspect 
and subject to close judicial scrutiny.”11  After Graham, it appeared that 
the debate over whether the Equal Protection clause prohibited alienage-
based discrimination might have been resolved.12  In recent years, the 
Supreme Court has considered the difference between the rights afforded 
to undocumented immigrants versus legal immigrants,13 but has yet to 
address what safeguards the Equal Protection Clause affords to 
nonimmigrants.14 
A question has arisen as to whether Graham’s analysis truly applies 
to alienage as a class, or if the Supreme Court merely afforded strict 
scrutiny review to one group of legal immigrants, legal permanent 
residents, but not to nonimmigrants.15  Three Circuit Courts have 
addressed this issue within the last ten years.  Both the Fifth and the 
Sixth Circuits have concluded that rational basis review applies to laws 
                                                                                                             
 5 Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 6 See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 7 See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 8 See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 9 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 366 (1971). 
 10 Id at 371–72; see also infra Part II.A. 
 11 Graham, 403 U.S. at 372. 
 12 Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 73–74 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 13 See discussion infra Part III.A.2. 
 14 See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982); see also infra notes 105–15 and 
accompanying text. 
 15 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
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that discriminate against nonimmigrants.16  These Courts have found that 
Graham’s holding only applies to legal permanent residents and not to 
nonimmigrants.17  The Second Circuit disagreed in Dandamudi, finding 
that Graham’s holding applied to nonimmigrants as well.18  The Second 
Circuit thus split from the Fifth and Sixth Circuits as to the appropriate 
level of review for such claims under the Equal Protection Clause.19  As 
a result of these rulings, the legitimacy of laws that discriminate against 
nonimmigrants varies depending on what part of the country the 
nonimmigrant resides in. 
This Comment addresses this present circuit split and argues that 
courts should review laws that discriminate against nonimmigrants using 
strict scrutiny analysis under the Equal Protection Clause of the United 
States Constitution.  Nonimmigrants are a suspect class, which has 
historically warranted the application of a strict scrutiny standard of 
review.20  In addition, the Supreme Court’s holding in Graham was 
meant to establish strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard of review for 
alienage as a whole.21  For these reasons, strict scrutiny is the appropriate 
level of review.22  Part II of this Comment contains a brief overview of 
immigration law and how it categorizes different classes of immigrants, 
as well as a brief discussion of the standards of review under the Equal 
Protection Clause.  Part III contains an analysis of the Supreme Court 
case law on immigration and Equal Protection challenges and a 
discussion of the current federal appellate and district court cases 
covering challenges to laws that restrict the rights and privileges of 
nonimmigrants.  Part IV discusses a variety of approaches to preventing 
legal discrimination against nonimmigrants and the consequences of each 
suggested approach.  Finally, Part V concludes that courts should review 
laws that discriminate against nonimmigrants under the strict scrutiny 
standard of review. 
                                                                                                             
 16 See discussion infra Part III B.1-2. 
 17 See discussion infra Part III B.1-2. 
 18 Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 19 Id. at  75–76. 
 20 See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 21 See discussion infra Part IV.A.2. 
 22 See discussion infra Part IV.A.1. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Equal Protection Clause and Levels of Review 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution states 
that “no state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
Equal Protection of the laws.”23  Historically, the Supreme Court applied 
the Equal Protection Clause to state laws that discriminated against 
different groups in an uneven manner.24  The Court later developed a 
more specific method of deciding Equal Protection cases, beginning with 
United States v. Carolene Products.25  In footnote four, the Court noted 
that it might apply “more exacting judicial scrutiny” to laws depending 
on, among other things, whether the law discriminated between 
“particular religious . . . or national . . . or racial minorities” or “discrete 
and insular minorities.”26  The Supreme Court later adopted the idea that 
it is appropriate to apply different levels of scrutiny to laws depending on 
what groups the laws distinguish between.27  The Court eventually 
developed three levels of scrutiny: strict scrutiny, intermediate or 
heightened scrutiny, and rational basis.28 
Strict scrutiny is the most exacting level of Equal Protection 
review.  To pass review under strict scrutiny, the proponent of the law 
must show that they are pursuing a compelling government interest and 
that the law is narrowly tailored and necessary to achieve this interest.29  
The courts will apply strict scrutiny review to classifications based on 
race or national origin.30  The Supreme Court has also applied strict 
scrutiny review to classifications based on alienage,31 though whether 
such classifications always trigger strict scrutiny review is, of course, the 
subject of continued debate.32  Rational basis is the lowest level of 
scrutiny and is the default applied by the courts in absence of a reason for 
a heightened level of scrutiny.33   For this standard of review, courts 
                                                                                                             
 23 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 24 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-
SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE, § 18.3(a)(i) (5th ed. 2012). 
 25 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 26 Id. 
 27 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 24, at § 18.3(a)(v). 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. at § 12.3(a)(iii). 
 30 Id. 
 31 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971);infra Part III.A.1. 
 32 See infra Part III.B. 
 33 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 24, at § 18.3(a)(ii). 
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evaluate only whether the classification has a rational relationship to 
some legitimate end that the government is pursuing.34  The Supreme 
Court has also applied an intermediate level of scrutiny in some cases, 
such as those discriminating on the basis of gender.35  While the specific 
formulation varies, intermediate scrutiny generally requires a court to 
evaluate whether there is an important government objective that is 
substantially related to the government action at issue.36  In certain 
circumstances, the Supreme Court has also applied intermediate scrutiny 
to undocumented immigrants.37 
The appropriate level of classification is determined by evaluating 
whether the group in question is a “suspect class” for the purpose of the 
Equal Protection Clause.38  The Court will look at a variety of factors, 
such as if the class is a “discrete and insular minority”39 or has been 
“subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated 
to such a position of political powerlessness,” to determine whether a 
class is suspect .40  If a court finds that the group in question is a suspect 
class, it will apply strict scrutiny review.41  If the group has some of the 
characteristics of a suspect class, a court may choose to apply a 
heightened form of scrutiny.42  But if the class is not suspect, it is 
unlikely that a court will apply anything other than rational basis 
scrutiny.43  Courts generally give a strong presumption of 
constitutionality to laws reviewed under rational basis.44  Therefore, 
heightened levels of scrutiny are far more advantageous to plaintiffs 
challenging these classifications.45 
B. The Classification of Aliens Under United States Law 
United States immigration law divides aliens into three major 
categories: legal permanent residents, undocumented immigrants, and 
nonimmigrants.46  The first category contains legal permanent residents 
                                                                                                             
 34 Id. 
 35 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976). 
 36 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 24, at § 18.3(a)(iv). 
 37 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982); see infra Part III.A.2. 
 38 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 24, at § 18.3(a)(iii).  
 39 U.S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 40 San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). 
 41 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 24, at § 18.3(a)(iii). 
 42 Id. at § 18.3(a)(iv). 
 43 Id. at § 18.3(a)(ii). 
 44 Id. at § 18.3(a)(v). 
 45 Id. 
 46 STEEL, supra note 3, at § 2:23. 
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(herein “LPRs”).47  Also referred to simply as immigrants, LPRs have the 
intention to stay in the United States permanently.48  LPRs obtain legal 
permits, often referred to as green cards, which allow them to remain in 
the United States permanently.49  LPRs can achieve permanent resident 
status through a variety of means, though the most common include 
“through family relationships, through a job, or as a refugee or asylee.”50  
The second category of aliens is undocumented immigrants or “illegal 
aliens.” Undocumented immigrants generally have fewer legal rights due 
to their illegal status.51 
The final category of immigrants is nonimmigrants, who are 
temporary, legal aliens.52  Nonimmigrants come to the United States “to 
engage in an activity encompassed within one of the nonimmigrant 
classifications set forth in the [Immigration and Nationality Act 
(“INA”)(8 U.S.C.A. § 1184)].” 53  They are required to establish 
“eligibility within one of the principal nonimmigrant classifications or 
one of the subclassifications” in order to qualify for a visa.54  The 
category covers a variety of individuals, such as “temporary workers, 
students, foreign diplomats, tourists, and business travelers.”55  The INA 
only permits nonimmigrants to remain in the United States for a finite 
period, though that period varies depending on the type of nonimmigrant 
visa.56 
This Comment focuses on nonimmigrants; specifically, those 
nonimmigrants that are in the United States for a longer period of time, 
such as those with work or student visas.  There are several types of 
student visas.  Nonimmigrants can attend a college program with an F-1 
visa, while Mexican and Canadian students can receive an F-3 visa for a 
similar purpose.57  The INA also provides for a variety of temporary 
work visas, including H-1B and H-1C visas.58  Additionally, “TN” 
                                                                                                             
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at § 2:24. 
 51 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219–20 (1982). 
 52 STEEL, supra note 3, at  § 2:23. 
 53 Id. at § 3.1. 
 54 Id. at § 2.28. 
 55 Justin Storch, Legal Impediments Facing Nonimmigrants Entering Licensed 
Professions, 7 MOD. AM. 12, 13 (2011). 
 56 STEEL, supra note 3, at § 3:12. 
 57 Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(f), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(15)(F) 
(2012); 22 C.F.R. § 41.12 (2012); see also STEEL, supra note 3, at § 3:12. 
 58 Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 (2012). 
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immigrants are a class of nonimmigrants created under the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).59  Workers with H-1B, H-
1C, and TN visas typically stay in the United States for an initial period 
of three years, and can later receive a three-year extension of the initial 
period.60  Thus, the work period is technically restricted to six years.61  
But many nonimmigrants remain in the country for longer, as “federal 
law permits many aliens with TN or H1-B status to maintain their 
temporary worker authorization for a period greater than six years.”62  
Generally, nonimmigrants enter the United States on a temporary basis 
and must attest that they do not intend to remain in the United States past 
the time allowed by their visa63 
Of particular note to this comment are nonimmigrants with longer-
term visas, such as work and student visas. The limited federal case law 
on nonimmigrants and the Equal Protection Clause involves challenges 
brought by nonimmigrants with work and student visas, who are usually 
the target of the discriminatory laws.64  While the analysis of this 
Comment focuses on nonimmigrants with work visas, its conclusions are 
applicable more broadly to nonimmigrants as a whole, who are generally 
in a legally vulnerable position because their status under the 
Constitution is unclear.65 As such, the conclusion that their vulnerable 
position merits suspect class status can be applied to all nonimmigrants.66 
III. IMMIGRATION AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE IN THE 
COURTS 
A. Supreme Court Precedent on Alienage 
1. Early Rulings on Alienage: Graham v. Richardson and its 
Progeny 
The Supreme Court initially determined the level of Equal 
Protection review afforded to aliens in Graham v. Richardson.  In 
Graham, the Court examined Arizona and Pennsylvania laws that 
                                                                                                             
 59 8 C.F.R. § 214.6. 
 60 Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 70 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 61 Id. at 71. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Storch, supra note 55, at 13. 
 64 See infra Part III.B. 
 65 See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
 66 See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
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restricted welfare benefits to citizens and long-term residents.67  The 
Court referred to the plaintiffs, who all had some form of LPR status, as 
“lawfully admitted residents.”68  Arizona and Pennsylvania argued that 
the Constitution permitted states to “favor United States citizens over 
aliens” and that doing so did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.69  
The plaintiffs argued that preventing aliens from accessing welfare 
benefits on an equal basis as their citizen counterparts was 
unconstitutional under both the Equal Protection Clause and the 
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.70 
The Court stated that the restrictive welfare laws “create two 
classes of needy persons, indistinguishable except with respect to 
whether they are or are not citizens of this country.”71   Invoking 
Carolene Products Co.’s famous footnote four, the Court found that 
“[a]liens as a class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ 
minority . . . for whom . . . heightened judicial solicitude is 
appropriate.”72  The Court therefore concluded that its decisions had 
“established that classifications based on alienage, like those based on 
nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial 
scrutiny.”73  While acknowledging that it had occasionally upheld 
statutes that distinguished between citizens and immigrants, the Court 
found that those distinctions had been necessary to protect specific 
“special interests of the State or its citizens.”74  Under the circumstances 
presented in the case, the Court held that the “State’s desire to preserve 
limited welfare benefits for its own citizens” was not a special interest 
sufficient to justify the state’s discrimination against the plaintiffs.75 
The Supreme Court focused on LPRs in its analysis and used the 
terms “resident aliens” and “lawful aliens” interchangeably throughout 
the opinion.76  The Supreme Court also relied on the similarities between 
LPRs and citizens to support its conclusions.77  It held that “[a]liens like 
citizens pay taxes and may be called into the armed forces,” and that 
                                                                                                             
 67 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 367–68 (1971). 
 68 Id. at 367–70. 
 69 Id. at  370–71. 
 70 Id. at 368–69. 
 71 Id. at 371. 
 72 Id. at 371–72. 
 73 Graham, 403 U.S. at 371–72. 
 74 Id. at 372. 
 75 Id. at 374. 
 76 Id. at 367–70. 
 77 Id. at 376. 
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“[u]nlike the short-term residents . . . aliens may live within a state for 
many years, work in the state and contribute to the economic growth of 
the state.”78  The Court distinguished “short-term residents” from 
permanent aliens, who share more in common with citizens.79  The 
Supreme Court further noted that states cannot argue that citizens have a 
special interest in tax revenue spent on citizens themselves when “aliens 
have contributed on an equal basis with the residents of the State.”80  By 
specifically framing the issue around the characteristics of LPRs, the 
Court may have been limiting its holding to that specific group of 
aliens.81  As such, the holding would exclude nonimmigrants, and laws 
discriminating against them would only be subject to rational basis 
review.82  Nevertheless, some scholars and at least one court have 
concluded that the Supreme Court intended its holding in Graham to 
apply to alienage in general, thus applying a strict scrutiny standard of 
review to classifications affecting all classes of legal immigrants.83  
Others have argued that the holding in Graham applied only to LPRs and 
not to nonimmigrants.84  These differing interpretations of Graham are 
the basis of the current circuit split over the level of Equal Protection 
review granted to nonimmigrants.85 
Following Graham, the Court addressed a variety of other Equal 
Protection challenges to state laws that discriminated on the basis of 
alienage.  In In re Griffiths, the Court struck down a Connecticut law 
limiting admission to the bar to citizens.86  The plaintiff in Griffiths, as in 
Graham, was an alien that had LPR status.87  In concluding that the 
Connecticut law violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Griffiths Court 
affirmed that “[c]lassifications based on alienage, like those based on 
                                                                                                             
 78 Id. 
 79 Graham, 403 U.S. at 376. 
 80 Id. 
 81 See generally LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2005); Van Staden v. St. 
Martin, 664 F.3d 56 (5th Cir. 2011); League of United Latin American Citizens v. 
Bredesen (LULAC), 500 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 82 See supra note 81. 
 83 See generally Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2012); Kirk v. N.Y. State 
Dep. Of Educ., 562 F.Supp.2d 405 (W.D.N.Y. 2008); Adam Bryan Wall, Justice For All? 
The Equal Protection Clause and Its Not-So-Equal Application To Illegal Aliens, 84 TUL. 
L. REV. 759 (2010). 
 84 See generally LeClerc, 419 F.3d 405; Van Staden. 664 F.3d 56; LULAC,,500 F.3d 
523,; Wall, supra note 83. . 
 85 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 86 In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 718 (1973). 
 87 Id. 
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nationality or race, are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial 
scrutiny.”88  As in Graham, the Court also emphasized the similarities 
between LPRs and citizens to support its holding.89  The Griffiths Court 
stated that “[r]esident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support the 
economy, serve in the Armed Forces, and contribute in myriad other 
ways to our society” and therefore the state “bear[s] a heavy burden 
when it deprives them of employment opportunities.”90  The Supreme 
Court cited these same factors to support the decision in Graham.91  In a 
later case, the Court again cited to these same factors in ruling that state 
financial aid statutes could not discriminate against certain classes of 
resident aliens.92  It specifically noted in Nyquist that resident aliens had 
to pay “their full share of taxes” and, as such, the law disproportionately 
burdened them over similarly-situated citizens.93  These subsequent 
decisions reinforced the view that the Supreme Court, in focusing on the 
characteristics of LPRs, intended to limit its holding to LPRs alone.  But 
the Court did not use these cases as an opportunity to explicitly establish 
that the holding in Graham was limited.  Therefore, Graham’s progeny 
merely added to the controversy over the extent of Graham’s protection 
without resolving the issue. 
2. Undocumented Immigrants and Plyler v. Doe 
Undocumented immigrants have also challenged laws under the 
Equal Protection clause, with varying degrees of success.  The Supreme 
Court ruled on such a claim in Plyler v. Doe, a case examining the 
legality of a school admissions policy that restricted the registration of 
children of undocumented immigrants.94  In Plyler, the Court initially 
dismissed the idea that undocumented aliens are a suspect class.95  
Specifically, the Court held that an individual’s undocumented status 
does not permit the same level of constitutional protections afforded to 
legal aliens.96  Therefore, it seemed that the Plyler Court had decided to 
apply rational basis review in the case.97 
                                                                                                             
 88 Id. at 721. 
 89 Id. at 722. 
 90 Id. 
 91 See supra notes 76–80 and accompanying text. 
 92 Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 4, 12 (1977). 
 93 Id. at 12. 
 94 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982). 
 95 Id. at 223. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
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But the Plyler Court went on to emphasize that the class at issue in 
the case was the children of undocumented immigrants, not just 
undocumented immigrants in general.98  The Court stated that the law at 
issue “imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not 
accountable for their disabling status.”99  The Court therefore required 
the state to point to a “substantial goal” furthered by the law.100  While 
the Supreme Court explicitly stated that it would use rational basis 
review, the “substantial goal” language implied that the Court was 
actually applying some form of heightened scrutiny.101  Ultimately, the 
Court struck down the restrictions on undocumented immigrant children 
under this heightened standard.102 
The Plyler decision complicated the analysis of how the Equal 
Protection Clause is used to review laws that discriminate on the basis of 
alienage by potentially introducing a third level of scrutiny. The Supreme 
Court stated in Plyler that it was applying rational basis review to the 
case.103  Plyler’s holding, however, seemed to actually apply a form of 
heightened review to undocumented immigrants as a class.104  As a 
result, courts now have three levels of scrutiny that could potentially 
apply to aliens.  The Plyler Court emphasized the fact that the 
undocumented immigrants at issue were children who were in a 
particularly vulnerable position through no fault of their own.105  The 
Court’s focus on the vulnerability of children implies that intermediate 
scrutiny would not usually apply to undocumented aliens.  Therefore, the 
actual holding of Plyler may be narrower than it first appears. 
3. Nonimmigrants and Toll v. Moreno 
The Supreme Court has only decided one case that contained an 
Equal Protection challenge to a law that discriminated against 
nonimmigrants: Toll v. Moreno.106  Toll involved the University of 
                                                                                                             
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 224. 
 101 See id. 
 102 Id. at 230 (“If the State is to deny a discrete group of innocent children the free 
public education that it offers to other children residing within its borders, that denial 
must be justified by a showing that it furthers some substantial state interest. No such 
showing was made here.”). 
 103 See id. at 224. 
 104 See id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 3 (1982); see also LeClerc v. Webb, 419 F.3d 405, 
416 (5th Cir. 2005). 
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Maryland’s decision to grant preferential tuition to students with a 
domicile in Maryland.107  Only citizens or LPRs with domicile, however, 
could receive these benefits.108  The university policy excluded 
nonimmigrants from these benefits, even if the particular type of visa the 
nonimmigrant held allowed them to establish domicile in the state.109  
Nonimmigrant students challenged the law, arguing that it violated the 
Equal Protection Clause by discriminating against nonimmigrants as a 
class in favor of citizens and LPRs.110  The plaintiffs argued in the 
alternative that federal immigration law, which designated that 
nonimmigrants with G-4 visas could establish domiciles, preempted the 
Maryland statute.111 
Without addressing the Equal Protection argument, the Supreme 
Court struck down the law on preemption grounds.112  The Court held 
that it “[had] no occasion to consider whether the policy violates 
the . . .  Equal Protection Clause.”113  The holding itself was very narrow, 
dealing only with a very small subset of nonimmigrants that were 
explicitly granted domicile status.114  The Court did not even consider the 
Equal Protection arguments.115  The Court seemed to avoid any 
discussion of the issue beyond recounting the District Court’s ruling 
below.116  As such, the question as to whether the Graham analysis 
should apply to nonimmigrants remained open following Toll. 
B. Circuit Courts Challenges to Laws Discriminating Against 
Nonimmigrants 
The federal circuits have only occasionally addressed challenges to 
laws discriminating against nonimmigrants.117  These cases have arisen 
                                                                                                             
 107 Toll, 458 U.S. at 3–4. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. at 3. 
 110 Id. at 4. 
 111 Id. at 3. 
 112 Toll, 458 U.S. at 10–17.  The Court held that Congress has expressly permitted the 
classes of nonimmigrants in question here to “establish domicile.”  Id.  Maryland was not 
permitted to remove this domicile status, as the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution 
made federal law preempt state law.  Id.  The Court “note[d] the substantial limitations 
upon the authority of the States in making classifications based upon alienage” in 
deciding Toll. Id. 
 113 Id. at 10. 
 114 Id. at 17. 
 115 Toll, 458 U.S. at 10. 
 116 Id. 
 117 For a discussion on these cases in their totality see discussion infra. 
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within the last ten years and are concentrated within three circuits: the 
Fifth, the Sixth, and the Second.118  The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have 
held that courts should consider laws that discriminate against 
nonimmigrants under rational basis review.119  Very recently, the Second 
Circuit has disagreed with its fellow circuit courts, holding that strict 
scrutiny review is appropriate for reviewing laws that restrict the 
employment of nonimmigrants.120  Accordingly, there is currently a split 
amongst the circuits as to the appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied 
in Equal Protection challenges to laws that exclude nonimmigrants. 
1. The Fifth Circuit: LeClerc v. Webb and Van Staden v. St. Martin 
In LeClerc v. Webb, the Fifth Circuit became the first circuit court 
to examine what level of scrutiny nonimmigrants should receive under 
the Equal Protection Clause.121  LeClerc addressed an Equal Protection 
challenge to a Louisiana law restricting state bar exam admissions to 
citizens and LPRs.122  The class of plaintiffs, from two consolidated 
cases, held several different types of nonimmigrant visas, including J-1 
student visas and H-1B work visas.123  Several of the plaintiffs had 
entered the United States under one of these types of visas but had then 
transitioned to others.124  The plaintiffs maintained that the law violated 
their Equal Protection rights by distinguishing their legal treatment from 
that of citizens and LPRs.125  The plaintiffs argued that the law should 
either be evaluated under strict scrutiny analysis because “under In re 
Griffiths, nonimmigrant aliens are a suspect class and state laws affecting 
them are subject to strict scrutiny,” or, at a minimum, under intermediate 
scrutiny because “nonimmigrant aliens are a quasi-suspect class.”126  The 
Fifth Circuit dismissed these arguments and held that rational basis was 
the appropriate level of review.127 
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As a threshold matter, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the holding 
in In re Griffiths128 was not applicable because it addressed 
discrimination against an LPR alien, and not whether strict scrutiny 
review applied to nonimmigrants.129  The court held that the differences 
between nonimmigrants and LPRs were “paramount.”130  The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Griffiths, the Fifth Circuit reasoned, turned on the 
fact that “resident aliens share essential benefits and burdens of 
citizenship . . . in a way that aliens with lesser legal status do not.”131  As 
such, the court concluded that Griffiths forbade the “total exclusion” of 
aliens in general, but did not forbid the exclusion of some classes of 
aliens.132 
The Fifth Circuit then considered two additional arguments: (1) that 
nonimmigrants constituted a suspect class for the purposes of Equal 
Protection analysis, and (2) that laws restricting nonimmigrants in 
general should receive strict scrutiny as a default.133  The court held that 
while alienage classifications are “subject to close judicial scrutiny as a 
general matter,” not all such classifications are inherently invalid or 
suspect.134  After Graham, the court noted, non-LPR aliens had only 
received rational basis review or, in the rare case of Plyler, heightened 
review.135  Further, the court held that the plaintiffs in Plyler only 
received heightened review because they were children and as such 
Plyler represented an outlier.136 
The court reasoned that the distinct traits of LPR status meant that 
such aliens were entitled to heightened judicial scrutiny, while 
nonimmigrants, lacking these traits, were not.137  Specifically, the Fifth 
Circuit noted that the Supreme Court has emphasized two conditions of 
LPRs that justified the application of strict scrutiny to laws that affected 
them: “(1) the inability of resident aliens to exert political power in their 
own interest given their status as virtual citizens; and (2) the similarity of 
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resident aliens and citizens.”138  In contrast, nonimmigrants, “who 
ordinarily stipulate . . . that they have no intention of abandoning their 
native citizenship,” did not merit “the extraordinary protection” that strict 
scrutiny provides.139  The Fifth Circuit placed a great deal of emphasis on 
nonimmigrants’ “temporary connection” to the United States.140  The 
court concluded that “[a]lthough aliens are a suspect class in general, 
they are not homogeneous and precedent does not support the 
proposition that nonimmigrant aliens are a suspect class.”141  The Fifth 
Circuit therefore held that the Supreme Court did not intend for 
nonimmigrants to receive a higher level of scrutiny and “decline[d] to 
extend the Supreme Court’s decisions concerning resident aliens to 
different alien categories when the Court itself has shied away from such 
expansion.”142  The court reviewed the state bar exam restrictions under 
rational basis review and ultimately upheld them.143 
The majority in LeClerc upheld the regulations on all grounds.144  
But in his dissent, Judge Stewart departed from the majority’s decision to 
apply rational basis review.145  Judge Stewart differed with the majority’s 
interpretation of Graham, noting that “the Supreme Court’s statement 
that ‘alienage is a suspect class’ by definition includes nonimmigrant 
aliens as part of that class.”146  The Supreme Court did not restrict its 
ruling in Graham to LPRs, Judge Stewart maintained, even though the 
Court used language referring to resident aliens.147  Judge Stewart stated 
that “the Supreme Court has referred to resident aliens, aliens and non-
citizens interchangeably,” and therefore “residence and immigration 
status should be understood as two separate distinctions; one does not 
necessarily have to do with the other.”148  According to the dissent, the 
Graham Court held that alienage in general was a suspect class.149 
Judge Stewart also disagreed with the way the majority 
distinguished nonimmigrants as a distinct class from LPRs.150  He argued 
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that the distinction between the two classes was not great enough to 
warrant different treatment under the Equal Protection Clause.151  
Instead, there were enough similarities between LPRs and 
nonimmigrants in important areas–such as the inability to vote and a 
history of discrimination–to warrant nonimmigrants’ inclusion as a 
suspect class.152  Judge Stewart also dismissed the alleged “transience” of 
nonimmigrant aliens, noting that “not all nonimmigrant aliens are 
required to keep a permanent residence abroad,” nor were they forbidden 
from intending to stay in the United States.153  The judge pointed to the 
State Department’s acceptance of the doctrine of dual intent, which 
permitted nonimmigrant aliens to “express a short term intent to remain 
in the United States temporarily (so as to not contravene the 
requirements of the visa under which they entered)” as well as “a long 
term intent to remain in the United States permanently (so that they may 
apply for adjustment of status).”154  The acceptance of dual intent showed 
that even the government acknowledged that nonimmigrants were not, as 
a group, transient.155  Judge Stewart concluded that “[t]he presumption 
should be that nonimmigrant aliens are part of the alien suspect class and 
the defendants should have the burden of proving the opposite.”156 
Six years after LeClerc, the question of the scope of Equal 
Protection rights for nonimmigrants was again before the Fifth Circuit in 
Van Staden v. St. Martin.157  Van Staden addressed the constitutionality 
of licensing restriction for nurses in Louisiana.158  Van Staden, a nurse 
authorized to work in the United States who was in the process of 
applying for LPR status, challenged a law allowing only LPRs and 
citizens to apply for nursing licenses.159  At the outset, the Fifth Circuit 
concluded that the case was “controlled by LeClerc.”160  The Fifth 
Circuit held that “[n]onimmigrant aliens satisfy neither of the conditions 
triggering strict scrutiny,” because nonimmigrants were neither discrete 
nor insular, had varied admission statuses, and lacked political capacity 
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due only to their temporary status.161  Additionally, the Fifth Circuit 
further concluded that applicants for LPR status should count as 
nonimmigrants for the purposes of Equal Protection challenges, and 
should not receive the same treatment as full-fledged LPRs.162  The Fifth 
Circuit thus applied rational basis review to the law and ultimately 
upheld the restrictions.163 
As the first cases to deal with laws discriminating against 
nonimmigrants, the Fifth Circuit’s rulings were particularly troubling.  
Both LeClerc and Van Staden established that nonimmigrants would not 
fall under the protections of Graham or the Court’s other alienage 
decisions.164  States within the Fifth Circuit were thus free to limit the 
ability of nonimmigrants to work in certain fields.  In the interim 
between the rulings in LeClerc and Van Staden, the Sixth Circuit joined 
the Fifth in ruling that laws discriminating against nonimmigrants would 
be evaluated under rational basis review.165 
2. The Sixth Circuit: LULAC v. Bredesen 
In the Sixth Circuit, the issue regarding the scope of Equal 
Protection rights for nonimmigrants arose in League of United Latin 
American Citizens (LULAC) v. Bredesen.166  In LULAC, the Sixth Circuit 
agreed with the Fifth Circuit by holding that state restrictions on 
nonimmigrants were not subject to strict scrutiny review.167  Unlike the 
Fifth Circuit cases, which addressed laws restricting employment, 
LULAC considered a law preventing nonimmigrants from receiving 
driver’s licenses.168  LULAC, a non-profit organization concerned with 
Hispanic rights, sued on behalf of its members, in addition to several 
individuals who could not obtain driver’s licenses due to their 
nonimmigrant status.169  The plaintiffs alleged that the law discriminated 
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against them based on their nonimmigrant status and that such 
discrimination violated the Equal Protection Clause.170 
Relying heavily on the Fifth Circuit’s analysis in LeClerc, the Sixth 
Circuit agreed that nonimmigrants are dissimilar as a class from LPRs.171  
The LULAC majority found that “there are abundant good reasons, both 
legal and pragmatic, why lawful permanent residents are the only 
subclass of aliens who have been treated as a suspect class.”172  The court 
reasoned that the case at hand did not provide any “compelling reason” 
to extend “the special protection afforded by suspect-class recognition” 
to nonimmigrants.173  It also dismissed the argument that subsequent 
Supreme Court cases, such as Nyquist, indicated that the Graham Court 
intended to extend strict scrutiny review to all classifications based on 
alienage.174  The Sixth Circuit concluded that as “the instant 
classification does not result in discriminatory harm to members of a 
suspect class,” rational basis was the appropriate standard to apply.175 
In a counterpoint to the LULAC opinion, Judge Gilman argued in 
his dissent that strict scrutiny review was the proper standard of Equal 
Protection review for laws that discriminated against nonimmigrants.176  
The judge fundamentally disagreed with the majority opinions in both 
LULAC and LeClerc, arguing that the Supreme Court intended Graham’s 
holding to apply to nonimmigrants.177  While acknowledging that the 
Court had “never specifically held that temporary resident legal aliens, as 
a subset of all aliens, are a suspect class for equal-protection purposes,” 
Judge Gilman deemed such silence irrelevant.178   Rather, he noted that 
the Graham majority had not restricted its analysis to LPRs exclusively, 
but had instead applied its reasoning to alienage classifications 
generally.179 
Judge Gilman further criticized the majority’s reliance on LeClerc, 
noting that it had adopted the LeClerc opinion “without even mentioning 
the numerous criticisms to which that analysis has been subject.”180  In 
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invoking Judge Stewart’s dissent in LeClerc, Judge Gilman stated that 
the majority had failed to address both that dissent and the other 
criticisms that the majority opinion had been subject to.181  Judge Gilman 
concluded that extending strict scrutiny review to nonimmigrants would 
not be expanding the Supreme Court’s ruling in Graham, but would 
merely apply the decision as the Court intended it.182 
The Sixth Circuit added its voice to the Fifth in rejecting the 
application of heightened scrutiny to laws discriminating against 
nonimmigrants.183 The LULAC opinion did not add substantially to the 
legal reasoning behind such a suggestion, as it mostly reiterated points 
already made by the LeClerc majority.184  The ruling was important in 
that it expanded the number of circuits denying heightened scrutiny. The 
only two circuits that had considered this question agreed in their 
conclusions.185 Only later when the Second Circuit ruled would a 
disagreement emerge among the federal circuits as to the proper level of 
scrutiny that should be applied.186 
3. The Second Circuit: Dandamudi v. Tisch and the Circuit Split 
Prior to the summer of 2012, the federal circuit courts were in 
limited agreement that courts should review laws that discriminated 
against nonimmigrants under rational basis review.187  But in Dandamudi 
v. Tisch, the Second Circuit departed from the Fifth and Sixth Circuits in 
ruling that such laws should instead be subject to strict scrutiny 
review.188  It did so on two grounds: (1) that the Supreme Court’s ruling 
in Graham meant that all classifications based on alienage were subject 
to strict scrutiny and (2) that nonimmigrants had all the characteristics of 
a suspect class and strict scrutiny must therefore be applied.189 
Prior to Dandamudi, the Second Circuit seemed receptive to the 
idea that strict scrutiny should apply to nonimmigrant Equal Protection 
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claims.190  In 2008, the United States District Court for the Western 
District of New York in Kirk v. New York State Department of Education 
considered whether a law restricting veterinarian licenses to citizens and 
LPRs violated the Equal Protection rights of an alien with a TN 
temporary work visa.191  The district court considered both the Fifth and 
Sixth Circuit majority opinions and dissents.192  It rejected the theory that 
the Supreme Court had limited its holding in Graham to LPRs.193  
Rather, the court concluded that “the challenged statute must be 
reviewed under the strict scrutiny standard” and that the law “fail[ed] to 
pass such scrutiny.”194  The Second Circuit never had the opportunity to 
review the decision in Kirk, however, as the plaintiff received LPR status 
shortly after prevailing in the district court.195 
One year later, the Second Circuit had another chance to address 
the scope of nonimmigrants’ Equal Protection rights in the case of 
Dandamudi v. Tisch.196  Dandamudi addressed the constitutionality of a 
New York law that prevented nonimmigrants from obtaining pharmacist 
licenses.197  The law required pharmacists to either be citizens of the 
United States or legal permanent residents.198  Although the law 
originally provided an exception allowing nonimmigrants to work as 
pharmacists, that provision had expired in 2006 and the legislature did 
not renew it.199  As a result, a number of nonimmigrants previously 
licensed as pharmacists in New York brought suit, arguing that the new 
restrictions violated their Equal Protection rights under the 
Constitution.200 
There were two types of nonimmigrant work visas at issue in 
Dandamudi: H1-B visas, which fall under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, and TN visas under NAFTA.201  These visas permitted 
the workers to stay in the United States for six years under the initial visa 
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and the extension.202  Federal law permitted them to stay longer and as a 
result “[a]ll plaintiffs in this case . . . ha[d] been legally authorized to 
reside and work in the United States for more than six years.”203  
Additionally, twenty-two of the plaintiffs had applied for LPR status at 
the time that the court decided Dandamudi.204 
The Second Circuit began by stating that “[t]here is no question that 
the Fourteenth Amendment applies to all aliens.”205  The court then 
proceeded to discuss Graham, concluding that while the Supreme Court 
had not explicitly applied strict scrutiny to nonimmigrant aliens, “the 
Court has never held that lawfully admitted aliens are outside of 
Graham’s protection.”206  In support of its position, the court pointed 
Nyquist and In re Griffiths, where the Supreme Court had reaffirmed its 
ruling in Graham without limiting it to LPRs.207 Indeed, the Second 
Circuit observed that “the Court has never distinguished between classes 
of legal resident aliens.”208  While the Supreme Court had carved out 
other exceptions to Graham, the court noted, it had never done so for 
nonimmigrants.209 The Second Circuit therefore rejected the argument 
that Graham’s analysis did not apply to nonimmigrants.210 
The Second Circuit also addressed the Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ 
position in LeClerc, Van Staden, and LULAC.211  The court rejected their 
rationale for three reasons.  First, the court rejected the notion that the 
Supreme Court’s discussion of “the similarities between citizens and 
aliens” in Graham had articulated “a test for determining when state 
discrimination against any one subclass of lawful immigrants is subject 
to strict scrutiny.”212  The Supreme Court was merely supporting its point 
in listing those factors, the Second Circuit noted, and was not creating an 
exhaustive test.213  The court further reasoned that the Fifth and Sixth 
Circuits’ argument that Graham’s language limited its holding to LPRs 
“reveals the danger of separating the words of an opinion from the 
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context in which they were employed.”214  In the Second Circuit’s view, 
the Supreme Court was merely stating that “LPRs and citizens have 
much in common [and that] treating them differently does not pass 
muster under the Fourteenth Amendment.”215  The Second Circuit held 
that “[t]he converse of this rationale, however, does not become a litmus 
test for determining whether a particular group of aliens is a suspect 
class.”216 
Second, the Second Circuit reasoned that “nonimmigrant aliens are 
but one subclass of aliens, and the Supreme Court recognizes aliens 
generally as a discrete and insular minority without significant political 
clout.”217  The court recognized that the Supreme Court in Graham had 
not distinguished between different subclasses of aliens, but rather 
between legal and illegal aliens.218  Graham’s language specifically 
spoke to alienage as a general class and not to LPRs only.219  Therefore, 
the Second Circuit explicitly rejected the Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ narrow 
reading of Graham.220 
Finally, the court found that even if it were to decide the 
appropriate level of scrutiny based on nonimmigrants’ similarity to 
citizens, it would still apply strict scrutiny “because nonimmigrant aliens 
are sufficiently similar to citizens that discrimination against them in the 
context presented here must be strictly scrutinized.”221  The Second 
Circuit pointed to a myriad of characteristics common to both 
nonimmigrants and citizens, including that nonimmigrants pay taxes 
“often on the same terms as citizens and LPRs” and that many 
nonimmigrants also had a far more permanent connection to the United 
States than other courts had acknowledged.222  Specifically, the court 
rejected the Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ dismissal of nonimmigrants as a 
discrete and insular minority partially due to the fact that nonimmigrants 
could only stay in the United States for six years and had to promise that 
they did not intend to remain permanently in the United States.223  
Acknowledging that many nonimmigrants do, in fact, stay in the United 
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States longer, the court pointed to the dual intent doctrine, which 
provided that nonimmigrants could express both “an intent to remain 
temporarily” under the their work visas and  “an intent to remain 
permanently” by applying for LPR status.224  The Second Circuit 
therefore concluded that “[t]he aliens at issue here are ‘transient’ in name 
only.”225  The court reasoned that “[a] great number of these 
professionals remain in the United States for much longer than six years 
and many ultimately apply for, and obtain, permanent residence.  These 
practicalities are not irrelevant.”226  Acknowledging that the Supreme 
Court applied heightened scrutiny to undocumented immigrants in 
Plyler, the Second Circuit also saw “no reason to create an exception to 
the Supreme Court’s precedent that would result in such illogical results” 
by applying a lower level of scrutiny to nonimmigrants than was applied 
to undocumented immigrants.227  Accordingly, finding “little or no 
distinction between LPRs and the lawfully admitted nonimmigrant 
plaintiffs [in Dandamudi],” the court held that strict scrutiny was the 
appropriate level of scrutiny to apply in the present case.228 
The opinion in Dandamudi makes it very clear that the Second 
Circuit found the Fifth and Sixth Circuits to have misapplied Supreme 
Court precedent to the issue at hand. 229 As a result, what had previously 
been a settled, if limited, issue of law became a circuit split.  As it stands, 
the question of what level of scrutiny laws discriminating against 
nonimmigrants should be evaluated under has two very distinctly 
different answers.  For the reasons argued below, the Second Circuit is 
clearly correct in its holding that such laws must be subject to strict 
scrutiny under existing Equal Protection jurisprudence. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. The Case for Strict Scrutiny 
The Second Circuit is the first circuit court to hold that the Equal 
Protection Clause requires courts to review laws that discriminate against 
nonimmigrants under a strict scrutiny level of review.230  Even prior to 
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Dandamudi, dissenting judges and scholars had argued that rational basis 
was not the appropriate level scrutiny for nonimmigrants.231  The Second 
Circuit’s ruling incorporated many of the arguments made previously by 
both commentators and the dissenters in LULAC and LeClerc.  As the 
subsequent discussion will show, strict scrutiny is the appropriate level 
of review for laws restricting the rights of nonimmigrants.  Graham and 
its subsequent expansions strongly suggest that the Supreme Court 
requires the application of strict scrutiny to classifications based on 
alienage.  In addition, strict scrutiny review of laws that discriminate 
against nonimmigrants is necessary to protect a vulnerable class of legal 
aliens. 
1. The Proper Application of Graham 
Graham extended strict scrutiny review to all classes of aliens, not 
only to LPRs.  It is true that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Graham 
focused on LPRs and their characteristics and that the opinion did not 
mention nonimmigrants explicitly.232  The Court stated that “short term” 
aliens did not share the same characteristics as citizens and LPRs, but it 
did not define what it meant by “short term.”233  The Court may have 
made this distinction with the intent to separate nonimmigrants as a 
whole from LPRs, or to distinguish nonimmigrants with shorter term 
visas.  While the Supreme Court did not decide this point conclusively, 
its opinion did not explicitly exclude nonimmigrants.234  The Court did, 
however, state in Graham that laws discriminating against “alienage” as 
a class should be subject to strict scrutiny review.235  This language 
implies that the holding was broad, not restrictive.  The Supreme Court 
likely focused on LPRs in Graham purely because the plaintiffs in the 
case were all LPRs. 
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As Judge Gilman argued in his dissent in LULAC, the Supreme 
Court’s silence on nonimmigrants in Graham “proves little.”236  While 
the Supreme Court may not have specifically discussed nonimmigrants 
in Graham, it did not explicitly leave them out either.  Indeed, in using 
such broad language regarding alienage, the Court may have meant to 
include nonimmigrants.237  Had the Court wanted to limit its holding to 
LPRs, it could have explicitly stated this rather than using general 
language about alienage.  The Supreme Court’s silence in Toll, its only 
case presenting an Equal Protection question on nonimmigrants, neither 
confirms nor denies that strict scrutiny is the appropriate level of 
review.238  Importantly, the Court has only explicitly excluded 
undocumented immigrants from its holding in Graham, but it did so 
largely due to their illegal status in the country.239  The Fifth and Sixth 
Circuits found that the list of similarities between citizens and LPRs in 
Graham shows that Graham applies only to LPRs.240  But the Second 
Circuit disagreed, holding that “nonimmigrant aliens are sufficiently 
similar to citizens that discrimination against them . . . must be strictly 
scrutinized.”241  Thus, the Second Circuit showed that the Graham 
analysis logically encompasses nonimmigrants as well as LPRs.242  
Contrarily, the Fifth and Sixth Circuits’ position that the Supreme Court 
used language in Graham meant to exclude nonimmigrants has no 
textual support.243  The silence of the Court on the issue and its previous 
rulings are strong support for the proposition that the Supreme Court 
intended its holding in Graham to apply to alienage as a whole, including 
nonimmigrants. 
2. Nonimmigrants as a Suspect Class 
Even if Graham’s holding is limited to LPRs, nonimmigrants still 
deserve strict scrutiny review.  As the Second Circuit and dissenting 
judges in LeClerc and LULAC that addressed this issue have suggested, 
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nonimmigrants should be considered a suspect class for the purposes of 
Equal Protection review.244  As such, the courts should review laws 
discriminating against nonimmigrants under strict scrutiny review. 
One common characteristic of a suspect class is the class’ inability 
to utilize the political process.245  The LeClerc majority suggested that, 
because nonimmigrants as a class are so varied, one cannot state that as a 
group they are unable to access the political process.246  But the variety 
of nonimmigrant visas available is irrelevant to whether nonimmigrants 
as a whole are unable to access the political process as easily as 
citizens.247  Because of their legal status in the country, nonimmigrants 
are just as separated from the political process as LPRs, if not more so. 
248 
Another argument that nonimmigrants are not a suspect class 
involves the lack of “permanency” within the class of nonimmigrants.249  
The Fifth Circuit tied nonimmigrants’ “temporary connection to this 
country” with their lack of legal capacity to conclude that nonimmigrants 
do not warrant suspect class status.250  The Fifth Circuit held that 
nonimmigrants are transient and have no permanent ties to the United 
States because they are required to maintain foreign citizenship and not 
remain in the United States.251  This is an overly literal interpretation of 
immigration law and the permanency of nonimmigrant residence.  The 
Second Circuit disagreed with this interpretation, and found that most 
nonimmigrants end up staying legally in the United States for longer 
periods of time and that many ultimately receive LPR status.252  The 
Second Circuit noted that one of the plaintiffs in the district court case 
preceding Dandamudi was dismissed during the appeals process because 
                                                                                                             
 244 See generally Dandamudi, 686 F.3d 66; LeClerc, 419 F.3d 405 (Stewart, J., 
dissenting); League of United Latin American Citizens v. Bredesen (LULAC), 500 F.3d 
523 (6th Cir. 2007) (Gilman, J., dissenting). 
 245 U.S. v. Carolene Products, Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also Graham v. 
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). 
 246 LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 417. 
 247 LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 428–29 (Stewart, J. dissenting).  See generally Fifth Circuit 
Holds That Lousiana Can Prevent Nonimmigrant Aliens From Sitting For The Bar, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 669 (2005). 
 248 Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 77. 
 249 See supra notes 153–55, 223–26 and accompanying text. 
 250 LeClerc, 419 F.3d at 417. 
 251 Id. 
 252 Dandamudi, 686 F.3d at 77. 
226 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 10:199 
 
he had received a green card.253  The previous Second Circuit district 
court case, Kirk, was also dismissed for this reason.254 
Nonimmigrants are a suspect class under the Equal Protection 
Clause. They are politically impotent, facing many of the same problems 
and prejudices as LPRs.255  Furthermore, the lack of permanency of 
nonimmigrants is an illusion, dispelled by the reality that many end up 
staying in the United States legally for a long period of time, ultimately 
receiving LPR status.256 Therefore, courts should review laws 
discriminating against nonimmigrants under strict scrutiny review. 
B.  Intermediate Scrutiny as a Viable Alternative 
Short of reviewing classifications based upon nonimmigrant status 
under strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny might appropriately apply to 
nonimmigrants.257  One could argue that if undocumented immigrants 
benefit from heightened scrutiny under Plyler, nonimmigrants deserve at 
least the same standard of review.258  Although the Supreme Court stated 
it was only using rational basis review in Plyler, under a closer reading it 
seems that the Court applied a heightened level of scrutiny.259  But this 
argument is premised on the assumption that the Supreme Court was 
granting heightened scrutiny to undocumented immigrants as a whole, 
and not merely applying it because the challenge involved children.260 
The Court’s focus on the vulnerability of children in particular may 
indicate that the holding is very narrow.261 If Plyler’s holding is limited 
only to cases involving undocumented immigrant children, or even only 
undocumented immigrant children’s education, its holding does not 
include undocumented immigrants as a whole.262 In that case, it seems 
likely that the court would merely apply rational basis review to laws 
discriminating against undocumented immigrants, as they purported to 
do in Plyler.263  If this is the true holding of Plyler, then the argument 
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that heightened scrutiny should be applied to cases involving 
nonimmigrants because it is the standard used for undocumented 
immigrants no longer exists. 
Alternatively, if the Supreme Court ever rejects the application of 
strict scrutiny to nonimmigrants, intermediate scrutiny review would still 
be a preferable alternative to rational basis review.  Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has applied heightened scrutiny to several other classes that it 
deemed not “discrete and insular” enough to receive strict scrutiny, but 
that deserved a lever of scrutiny that is slightly higher than rational basis 
review.264  Therefore, it is plausible that the Supreme Court would chose 
to apply heightened scrutiny to nonimmigrants. The case for strict 
scrutiny review is still strong,265 however, and it is the preferable 
standard of review because of the greater level of protection it affords to 
suspect classes.266 
C. Preemption and the Supremacy Clause 
Preemption arguments have been utilized in several of the 
nonimmigrant challenges. Several commentators have supported the use 
of the supremacy clause as a method of striking down such laws.267  The 
argument is that the federal government occupies the immigration field 
in general, or at the very least, specific statutes on immigration 
regulating the work of nonimmigrants preempt state restrictions in the 
same area.  Graham spoke to this issue when it held that “[s]tate laws 
that restrict the eligibility of aliens for welfare benefits merely because of 
their alienage conflict with these overriding national policies in an area 
constitutionally entrusted to the Federal Government.”268  The Supreme 
Court therefore held that immigration is an area traditionally occupied by 
the federal government.269 
Most recently, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the federal 
government’s supremacy in the immigration field in Arizona v. United 
States.270  There the Court stated that “[t]he federal power to determine 
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immigration policy is well settled.”271  The Court therefore struck down 
several sections of an Arizona law dealing with immigration, holding 
that “[t]he Federal Government has occupied the field of alien 
registration” and as such “field preemption” prevented the states from 
interfering.272  The Court struck down other sections of the law when 
they were obstacles in the fulfillment of the purpose of Congress.273  
Arizona stands as an affirmation of the overwhelming powers of 
Congress to control immigration law, and the limited ability of states to 
add additional restrictions on immigrants.274 
The LeClerc and LULAC majorities accepted the federal 
government’s power in the immigration field while arguing that federal 
law would not actually preempt the challenged state laws.275  In LeClerc, 
the Fifth Circuit dismissed the preemption argument, invoking both state 
police powers and arguing that there could be harmonious regulation by 
both the state and federal government.276  But as Arizona shows, the 
Supreme Court may be less inclined to allow states to control in areas of 
immigration than certain circuit courts have been.277  The Second Circuit 
in Dandamudi reasoned that the federal government had control over the 
field of immigration, and preemption by federal immigration law might 
disallow even complementary state regulation.278  The court concluded 
that because the visas involved are permission from the federal 
government to work in a specific field, the INA would preempt state 
laws restricting nonimmigrants from working in that field.279 
The Supremacy Clause may not be the best way to eliminate states’ 
classifications on the basis of nonimmigrant status, however, as 
preemption challenges do not necessarily resolve whether all state 
classifications on the basis of nonimmigrant status are constitutional.  
For example, some of the laws challenged in the circuit court cases 
addressed state laws that restricted job licenses, which the work visa 
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provisions in the INA might preempt.280  Another, however, involved 
drivers’ licenses,281 which might fall outside the federal government’s 
immigrations powers and more within the state’s powers.  Additionally, 
the court in Dandamudi did not strike down the New York license 
restriction on preemption grounds because some of the plaintiffs had TN 
visas, which precluded that argument.282  Therefore, while preemption 
arguments are important in resolving state authority to regulate 
nonimmigrants, they are not dispositive. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Courts should review laws that discriminate against nonimmigrants 
using strict scrutiny review.  Legal Permanent Residents and 
nonimmigrants should receive the same treatment under the Equal 
Protection Clause.  Nonimmigrants have come to the United States 
legally for a specified purpose, most commonly to continue their studies 
or work in a specific field.283  Many stay for a significant period of time 
before becoming legal permanent residents and eventually citizens.284  
Yet, in several circuits nonimmigrants do not receive the same protection 
under the law as LPRs.285  But they should.  Nonimmigrants are as 
deserving of the protection that strict scrutiny review affords because 
they are a suspect class that fits into the category of a discrete and insular 
minority.286  They face many of the same problems as LPRs and are just 
as politically powerless, if not more so.287  Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court has never explicitly granted them a lesser status than LPRs and has 
implied that they deserve the same levels of protection.288  The Court’s 
holding in Graham applies to alienage as a whole, not merely to LPRs.289  
Therefore, there is clearly precedent to establish any law discriminating 
against nonimmigrants should be subject to strict scrutiny review under 
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the Equal Protection Clause.  To do otherwise would fail to protect 
vulnerable group and offer them far less protection than is afforded to 
other similarly situated groups. 
 
